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Abstract
This research exploits the event of immigration to establish that institutions have a
persistent e¤ect on culture. It is argued that immigrants coming from corrupt countries,
tend to overtrust the institutions at the host country. This inated trust of immigrants is
documented as the Great Expectations e¤ect. This result is interesting and intriguing for
several reasons. First, it highlights the persistent e¤ect of institutions (at the origin coun-
try) on the cultural attitudes of immigrants. Interestingly, this e¤ect is rather persistent
and can be detected even to the second generation immigrants. Second, the analysis
explores whether mean attitudes at the origin country have an e¤ect on immigrants
attitude. The ndings suggest that mean attitudes do not confer a statistically signicant
e¤ect, whereas a horserace between origin institutions and origin culture suggests that it
is the e¤ect of institutions that prevails. Last, the analysis establishes that the inated
trust of immigrants a¤ects their political attitudes. Immigrants coming from corrupt
countries tend to be less interested in politics, to overtrust the host governments and to be
less active in the political arena. In a globalized world where international immigration
is rather extensive, pinning down the cultural di¤erences across immigrants and thus
the di¤erences in their political attitudes is of an essence.
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1 Introduction
The interplay between culture and political institutions has long been debated and explored
in the economics literature. Identifying the traces of culture, contributes to pinning down
di¤erences across societies that cannot be fully accounted for by geographical, historical and
economic di¤erences. Moreover, acknowledging the presence of cultural di¤erences across
societies, triggers questions as to the origin of these di¤erences and thus the determinants of
culture. The aim of this paper is to identify institutions as one of the determinants of culture.
Attempting to give a response to the question whether culture or institutions came
rst is tantamount to the "chicken-egg" question. Thus, addressing the issue of endogeneity
inherent in their between relationship is a challenging task. A number of intuitive approaches
have been adopted, such as exploiting exogenous institutional shocks, in order to establish a
causal e¤ect running from institutions to culture. Representative examples of these approaches
are the experience of socialist regimes or the fall of the iron curtain (e.g. Shiller et al. (1992),
Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007)).
This research attempts to undertake this challenge via exploiting the event of immi-
gration in order to establish the persistent e¤ect of institutions on culture. In particular, it is
argued that immigrants coming from corrupt countries, tend to overtrust the institutions at
the host country. This inated trust of immigrants is documented as the Great Expectations
e¤ect. This result is interesting and intriguing for several reasons. First, it highlights the
persistent e¤ect of institutions (at the origin country) on the cultural attitudes of immigrants.
Interestingly, this e¤ect is rather persistent and can be detected even to the second generation
immigrants. Second, the analysis explores whether mean attitudes at the origin country
(i.e., mean trust towards institutions at the origin country) have an e¤ect on the immigrants
attitude. The results of the empirical section suggest that in the case of trust towards
institutions, mean attitudes at home do not confer a signicant e¤ect. More importantly,
a horserace between origin institutions and origin culture suggests that it is the e¤ect of
institutions that prevails. Last, the analysis establishes that the inated trust of immigrants
a¤ects their political attitudes and participation. Immigrants coming from corrupt countries
tend to be less interested in politics, to overtrust the host governments and to be less active in
the political arena. In a globalized world where international immigration is rather extensive,
pinning down the cultural di¤erences across immigrants and thus the di¤erences in their
political attitudes is of an essence.
Analytically, the empirical part of the paper explores three main hypothesis. The rst
hypothesis is whether a Great Expectations e¤ect exists, i.e., whether immigrants coming
from countries with low quality of institutions tend to overtrust host institutions. To explore
this hypothesis, a sample of 22997 rst and second generation immigrants is exploited, derived
from the European Social Survey (Rounds 2 (2004)-6 (2012)). These immigrants come from
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134 countries and have immigrated to 34 European countries. The cultural attitudes that
are explored are trust in the (host) parliament, legal system, politicians and political parties.
The ndings of the empirical section suggest that immigrants coming from corrupt countries
(the measure of corruption employed is the ICRG index of corruption)1 tend to overtrust
political institutions at the host country. This e¤ect is stronger for the rst generation
immigrants and somewhat attenuated, but still present, in the second generation immigrants.
Notably, this e¤ect is present even after controlling for a large number of controls capturing
the socioeconomic status of the immigrant as well as the process of assimilation.
Is this an anticipated result? The answer is ambivalent. On the one hand this
nding sounds rather plausible, i.e., trusting the institutions of other countries more than
the institutions in your (corrupt) country. On the other hand, the literature on interpersonal
trust suggests the opposite, i.e., that individuals coming from corrupt countries tend to be
mistrustful towards other individuals in general, i.e., they manifest lower levels of interpersonal
trust. This nding is also conrmed in the context of this paper, using the same sample of
immigrants. The analysis establishes that immigrants coming from more corrupt countries
tend to mistrust other people even in the host country. Yet, they overtrust host institutions.
These ndings underline a divergence in the two types of trust. Low institutional quality at
the origin country triggers di¤erent e¤ects on each type of trust, i.e., it increases immigrants
trust towards host institutions and decreases interpersonal trust of immigrants in the host
country.
The second hypothesis further challenges the Great Expectations e¤ect. Is it origin
institutions that a¤ect immigrantstrust in institutions or is it the mean attitudes at home,
i.e., cultural inertia? To explore this hypothesis, the analysis runs a horserace between origin
institutions and mean attitudes. The results clearly suggest that: i) mean attitudes at home
have no e¤ect on immigrants trust, and ii) the dominant e¤ect is that of origin institutions.
The second hypothesis clearly suggests that institutions have a persistent e¤ect on culture.
Moreover, these ndings are again in contrast with the ndings on interpersonal trust which
suggest that mean trust at home is the dominant factor a¤ecting the level of interpersonal
trust of immigrants.
Having established the dominance of the Great Expectations e¤ect, the third hypoth-
esis explores its practical implications. In particular, it establishes that immigrants coming
from corrupt countries tend to prefer a stronger government, nd it more important to follow
rules, are less likely to participate in political campaigns, are less likely to sign a petition
and overall are less interested in politics. These results prevail even after accounting for the
di¢ culties that they may face as a discriminated group and their degree of assimilation and
are line with the rational of Aghion et al. (2010), who argue that higher trust of individuals
1The results are robust to the use of alternative measures of institutional quality.
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towards institutions is associated with lower demand for regulation in the host country and
thus lower willingness to actively participate in politics. Evaluating whether this is a good
or a bad political outcome is beyond the scope of the analysis. Yet, one can identify both
positive and negative aspects. On the positive side it can be desirable as lower demand for
regulation is associated with lower actual regulation and lower bureaucratic burden (Aghion
et al., 2010). On the negative side it can be argued that less active citizens impose a lower
level of checks and balances towards institutions which may deteriorate institutional quality
in the long run.
A number of interesting issues, associated with the Great Expectations hypothesis,
merit further discussion. First, as already analyzed above there is a clearly di¤erent pattern
between the determinants of interpersonal trust and trust in institutions. The empirical section
of the paper establishes the di¤erences between these two types of trust while employing the
same sample of immigrants. Second, it is discussed whether this e¤ect is driven by immigrants
coming from poor countries or whether it is valid even for immigrants coming from developed
countries. Restricting the analysis to a sample of European immigrants, whose countries are
in a similar stage of development, suggests that the results are valid even for the restricted
sample (with the exception of trust in the legal system, thus highlighting the di¤erences
between perceptions of legal and political institutions). Moreover, explicitly exploring how the
stage of development a¤ects the analysis, yields similar results. Last, the issue of selection is
extensively explored. A number of arguments, lengthily discussed below, suggest that selective
immigration is not driving the Great Expectations e¤ect. More importantly, conducting the
same analysis in a sample of pairs of immigrant groups, who all reside in the same host
country, suggests that di¤erences in the levels of corruption of their origin countries can
account for di¤erences in their levels of trust towards the host institutions. Therefore, even if
all immigrants select their destination country for its good institutions, the bilateral analysis
can net this e¤ect out and still establish the Great Expectations e¤ect. Finally, the empirical
results are robust to an extensive set of robustness checks.
The mechanics of the Great Expectations e¤ect are laid down in a simple theoretical
model. The model describes three possible states of the world: i) a state where no immigration
occurs, ii) a state where immigration takes place driven by exogenous di¤erences in wages,
and iii) a stage where immigrants may transmit their cultural traits to their o¤spring. The
theoretical analysis establishes that as long as the individuals manifest di¤erent cultural traits
this may lead to di¤erent levels of trust towards institutions, to di¤erent levels of political
participation as well as to the emergence of a culturally heterogeneous group where both traits
may coexist. An extension of the model addresses the issue of selection and indicates why
this e¤ect is not driven by selective immigration.
Section 2 explores in detail the related literature. Section 3 of the paper presents a
simple model that captures the mechanics of theGreat Expectations e¤ect. Section 4 describes
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the data, the empirical strategy and extensively discusses the issue of selective immigration.
Section 5, presents the baseline empirical results of the paper. Section 6 discusses some issues
related to the baseline analysis, whereas Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper relates to several strands of the literature on cultural economics. First it builds
upon the literature that identies the transmission of cultural traits via exploiting the event
of immigration. Giuliano (2007) has exploited variations in the living arrangements of second
generation immigrants living in the US to establish that the sexual revolution of the 70s had
a di¤erential impact on the living arrangements in Northern and Southern Europe. Fernández
and Fogli (2009) have exploited variations in the fertility rates of second generation women
currently residing in the US and have established that di¤erences in fertility can be traced
to di¤erences in culture. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) establish that the structure of the
family has a pronounced e¤ect on the economic behavior and the attitudes of immigrants and
a¤ects both labor force participation and mobility of women and the youth. Algan and Cahuc
(2010) have exploited the cultural transmission of trust traits in order to construct a panel for
trust attitudes and estimate a causal e¤ect of trust on growth. Luttmer and Singhal (2011)
highlight that di¤erences in the preference for redistribution are positively correlated to the
mean preferences of the country of origin. Carpantier and Litina (2014) exploit the inherited
component in the religiosity of second generation immigrants to explore the e¤ect of several
aspects of religiosity on economic outcomes. Litina et al. (2014) argue that environmental
preferences are not a¤ected by the country of origin environmental conditions, instead what
prevails is the mean preferences at the origin country.
Second, the paper relates to the literature that explores the persistent e¤ect of institu-
tions on culture. The main challenge of this literature is to identify changes in the institutional
regime that are exogenous to the forces of cultural evolution. Shiller et al. (1992) explored the
e¤ect of socialism on individual traits by exploiting the collapse of communism. The ndings
suggest that there is hardly any e¤ect on traits such as entrepreneurial spirit, leadership or
risk attitudes. Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) exploit the natural experiment of the
German unication to establish that East Germans are more favorable towards redistribution
and state intervention. Becker et al. (2011) advance the hypothesis that the Hapsburg empire
has a long lasting e¤ect on current attitudes of individual with respect to trust and corruption
in courts and the police. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) exploit exogenous variation from
macroeconomic shocks to establish that individuals who have been through a recession at the
early stages of their life are more favorable towards government redistribution and are more
left-wing oriented.
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The interplay between culture and institutions is also a central theme in this literature.
This nexus has been identied in Aghion et al. (2010) who explore the correlation between
regulation and distrust and argue that in the presence of a high level of trust there is low
demand for regulation. Alesina et al. (2010) establish the e¤ect of family ties on labor
market regulation and nd two di¤erent equilibria characterized by high (low) mobility and
unregulated labor markets (labor market rigidity) in the presence of strong (weak) family ties.
Pinotti (2012) shows that di¤erences in trust capture most of the variation in entry regulations.
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 2014) argue that culture prevails over institutions and
can account for within ethnicity di¤erences in economic performance, as proxied by light
density. The interplay between institutions and culture has also been widely developed in the
context of the comparative development literature (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2005; Ashraf and
Galor, 2011b; Galor, 2011; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Ashraf and Galor, 2013)).
The paper also relates to a literature from the eld of sociology that explores several
aspects of the acculturation hypothesis. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) argue that immigrants
anticipate more from the political institutions in the new country. Initially their expectations
are fullled but do not carry to the next generations. Similarly a number of studies have
argued that immigrants coming from poor countries with low quality of institutions tend to
manifest high levels of trust that dissipate over time with the duration of stay and vanish
in the second generation (Michelson, 2003; Wenzel, 2006; Maxwell, 2010; Roder and Muhlau,
2012; Adman and Stromblad, 2013; Roder and Mohlau, 2011).
The contribution of the paper lies in establishing a causal e¤ect from institutions to
culture and in capturing the interplay between the two. First, it exploits variations in the
quality of institutions at the origin country to explore whether origin institutions have an e¤ect
on the cultural attitudes of immigrants. Interestingly, the ndings suggest that immigrants
coming from corrupt countries tend to manifest an inated level of trust in host institutions,
an e¤ect that is documented as the Great Expectations e¤ect and is transmitted even to the
second generation immigrants. Second, it dissects the forces behind the formation of culture.
It identies two forces, the e¤ect of institutions at the origin country vs. the e¤ect of mean
attitudes at the origin country. It establishes that theGreat Expectations e¤ect is solely driven
by the quality of origin institutions whereas mean attitudes do not have any e¤ect on trust
in institutions. Third, the policy results of this paper indicate that immigrants coming from
corrupt countries demand less regulation and are less active politically in the host country.
Last, it contributes to a large literature that has explored the e¤ect of interpersonal
trust on the society and the economy. See e.g. Knack and Keefer (1997) and Guiso et al.
(2006) for an exploration of the e¤ect of social capital on economic performance, Guiso et al.
(2004) for the e¤ect of social capital on nancial markets, Sangnier (2013) for the e¤ect of
trust on macroeconomic stability and Algan and Cahuc (2010) for the (causal) e¤ect of trust
on growth.
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Whereas the analysis in the paper focuses primarily on political trust, nevertheless the
implications on interpersonal trust have been explored as well. The ndings are intriguing
as they suggest that the Great Expectations e¤ect is not present in the case of interpersonal
trust. Lower institutional quality is associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust of
both immigrants and natives. Moreover, in the horserace between the e¤ect of institutions
and of mean interpersonal trust it is mean attitudes at home that prevail. The comparison
between interpersonal trust and trust in institutions highlights the divergence in the attitudes
of immigrants with respect to these two forms of trust.
3 The Model
The aim of the model is to illustrate a simple mechanism that can give rise to the Great
Expectations e¤ect i.e., the inated level of the trust of immigrants towards the host institu-
tions. The decision to immigrate is exogenous and assumed to be driven by purely economic
incentives, i.e., by higher wages in the host country. The analysis explores three cases: i)
the case where no immigration has taken place, ii) the case where immigration has taken
place, and iii) upon immigration, the transmission of cultural traits from immigrants to their
o¤spring.
The underlying assumption in case (ii) is that no selective immigration takes place.
The analysis in case (ii) is further extended to discuss potential selection concerns, i.e., the
possibility that individuals immigrated not driven by economic incentives, instead driven by
their preferences for the institutions of the host country. The ndings of this part are in line
with the literature that discusses selection as well as the results of the empirical section of
the paper, and suggest that selection is not the driving force behind the Great Expectations
e¤ect.
3.1 Case I: No Immigration
Assume that the world is populated by two groups, group a and group b; that are exactly
identied with a cultural trait, also denoted by a and b: For simplicity it is assumed that each
group is homogeneous represented by a single individual i; where i = a; b. The utility function
of each individual is given by
Ui = Ci  D(Ii): (1)
Ci denotes consumption and is described by the equation Ci = (1   li)wi: Each
individual has one unit of time that he allocates between work and leisure, where (1   li)
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is the fraction of time allocated to work (0  li  1). wi is the exogenous wage rate for each
unit of labor.
D(I) is a term that captures distrust towards perceived institutional quality, I; and
thus suggests that individuals derive disutility from distrust towards bad institutions. For the
shake of convenience, an explicit simplied functional form for distrust is dened, given by
D = 1=Ii = i( Ai;
i)=liAi: (2)
Ii is dened as "perceived institutional quality" since it comprises a subjective com-
ponent, i.e., how individuals perceive the quality of institutions, and an objective component,
i.e., the actual quality of institutions. The subjective component, i; is the cultural component
associated with institutional quality, i.e., the individual subjective evaluation of institutional
quality. In particular, it is interpreted as intolerance towards bad institutions. The higher is
the value of i; the higher is the intolerance of the individual towards bad institutions and
thus the higher is his disutility for each given quality of institutions. Two are the factors
that determine the level of i( Ai; i) : i) the mean attitudes of the other individuals who
live in the same country, i, and ii) the e¤ect of the average quality of institutions at the
residence country, Ai.2 Based on empirical evidence, it is assumed that @i( Ai; i)=@Ai > 0;
i.e., intolerance increases with the quality of institutions, and @i( Ai; i)=@i > 0; i.e., there
is inertia in attitudes.3
Ai is the actual level of institutional quality as is measured by e.g., international
organizationsevaluation on the extend of political corruption or of tax evasion. The higher
is the actual institutional quality the lower is D(Ii) and thus the lower the distrust towards
bad institutions. li is the fraction of time that is not allocated to work. For the shake of the
empirical hypotheses that will be advanced, it is assumed that the leisure time, li; is allocated
in activities that are related to political participation and are aimed to reduce the disutility
from bad institutional quality, e.g., signing a petition or participating in a political campaign.
The individual chooses li in order to maximize
max
li
Ui = (1  li)wi   i(
Ai; i)
liAi
: (3)
2It is implicitly assumed that Ai captures the average quality of institutions in the past (e.g., the mean of
the past x years) and thus is not a¤ected by the current state of institutions Ai. For analytical convenience
though it is assumed that if Aa > Ab =) Aa > Ab (i.e., no structural breaks in the quality of institutions).
Moreover, the dimension of time is not added in the model as it would unecessarily complicate the analysis.
3This assumption is supported by evidence from a number of surveys, e.g., the World Values Survey and
a number of empirical studies. Kountouris and Remoundou (2013) establish that immigrants coming from
countries where the tax morale is low and/or tax institutions are of lower quality, tend to justify tax evasion
more. Litina and Palivos (2014) illustrate that on average corrupt countries tend to manifest lower level of
tax morale, as well inertia in attitudes related to tax morale. Inertia of other types of attitudes is established
in a number of papers described in the literature review.
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Maximization of 3 yields
li =

i( Ai;
i)
wiAi
1=2
(4)
Lemma 1 describes the comparative static properties of the optimal solution.
Lemma 1 (Comparative Statics) i) @li =@i( Ai; i) > 0, i.e., the higher is the intolerance for
bad institutions, i( Ai; i); the more time individuals will allocate to political activities; ii)
@li =@Ai > 0, i.e., the higher is the institutional quality, Ai, the less time will be allocated to
political activities; iii) @li =@wi > 0, i.e., the higher is the salary, wi; the less will be the time
allocated in political activities.
Proof. Results (i)-(iii) can be obtained by taking the derivatives of li with respect to each
parameter. 
3.2 Case II: Immigration
Having described the basic structure of the economy where immigration does not take place,
this section will make the simplifying assumption that the individual b (now referred to as an
immigrant) moves to the country of individual a (now referred to as a native): As the aim of
the model is not to address the issue of endogenous immigration, the decision to migrate is
assumed exogenous and is driven by economic incentives, i.e., by higher wages in country a
(wa > wb): It is also assumed that institutions in the host country a are of better quality than
those of the country b; i.e., that Aa > Ab; and that individuals coming from corrupt countries
are more tolerant with bad quality institutions, i.e., that a( Aa; a) > b( Ab; b):
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Using eq. (5) and taking into account that both individuals a and b are now faced with
the same salary, wb; and the same institutional quality, Aa; comparisons between the time
allocated to political activities by natives and immigrants, yield the following inequality:
la > l

b for a( Aa; a) > b( Ab; b) (5)
suggesting that immigrants coming from low institutional quality countries, who are
more tolerant towards bad institutions (a( Aa; a) > b( Ab; b)), tend to allocate less time
than the natives in political activities.
Using inequality (4) and extending the argument to the levels of distrust towards host
institutions manifested by immigrants and natives, yields that:
D(Ia) > D(Ib) for a( Aa; a) > b( Ab; b); (6)
4This assumption is based upon empirical evidence. However, to explore the issue of potential selection,
the last section of the model challenges this assumption.
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i.e., the distrust of natives is higher than the distrust of immigrants coming from
countries with lower quality of institutions and higher tolerance towards bad institutions. In-
equalities (4) and (5) yield the following proposition, that derives the three testable hypotheses
of the empirical section.
Proposition 1 Immigrants coming from low institutional quality countries and who are more
tolerant towards bad institutional quality (i.e., a(Aa; a) > b(Ab; b)) tend to be more trustful
towards host institutions compared to natives (i.e., D(Ia) > D(Ib)).
Moreover:
i) @D(Ib)=@ Ab > 0; i.e., the lower is the average (past) institutional quality at the origin
country, the lower is the distrust towards the host institutions (the Great Expectations e¤ect);
ii) @D(Ib)=@b > 0 i.e., the lower is the intolerance towards bad institutions at the origin
country, the lower is the distrust towards the host institutions (inertia in attitudes); and,
iii) Immigrants coming from countries with lower quality of institutions and who are more
tolerant towards bad institutions tend to allocate less time to political activities (i.e., la > l

b).
3.2.1 Selection
The main assumptions behind the results stated in Proposition 1 are the following: i) each
group is homogeneous, and ii) immigrants from countries with lower average institutional
quality, Aa > Ab; are more tolerant towards bad quality institutions, i.e., that a( Aa; a) >
b( Ab;
b): Whereas assumption (ii) builds on a number of empirical ndings papers, yet it
precludes, along with assumption (i), the possibility of selective immigration.
This subsection will assume that immigrants who move to a host country are una¤ected
by the origin country institutions and mean attitudes, and thus their intolerance towards
institutions is not a¤ected by Aa and a respectively. Therefore, the fact that Aa > Ab does
not necessarily imply that a > b:
Removing this assumption, and simply assuming that b reects solely the idiosyncrasy
of the immigrant, the following cases of selective immigration may emerge:
i) Overly intolerant immigrants, displeased by the quality of institutions at the origin
country, move to their selected host country, i.e., a < b. In that case, using inequalities (5)
and (6) would imply that la < l

b and D(Ia) < D(Ib).
ii) Immigrants who choose a host country because of its quality of institutions, and
whose intolerance is aligned with that of the natives, move to their selected host country
where, a = b. In that case, using inequalities (5) and (6) would imply that l

a = l

b and
D(Ia) = D(Ib):
In both cases, the ndings suggest that if selective immigration took place along the
dimension of preferences for institutional quality, the Great Expectations e¤ect would not be
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detected. The empirical section explores whether selective immigration along the dimension
of institutions occurs on not.5
3.3 Case III: Cultural Transmission
In this section it is briey explored whether the immigrant, b, upon having immigrated to the
country a; and having manifested higher levels of trust towards host institutions as Proposition
1 suggests, transmits this inated level of trust to his o¤spring. To explore this hypothesis,
a mechanism a la Bisin&Verdier is employed (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). In line with their
terminology, it is assumed that each individual, a or b; is associated with the equivalent
particular cultural trait, in which case would be intolerance towards bad quality institutions
( i.e., a and b).
Focusing explicitly at the immigrant, b; his utility function is given by
Ub = Cb  D(Ib) + T (lb) + (PbbVbb + PbaVba) ; a 6= b: (7)
The utility is similar to eq. (1) with the addition of two new terms that capture the
transmission process. First note that
D(Ib) = 1=Ib = b( Ab;
b)=lbAa: (8)
where the new parameter, ; denotes the fraction of leisure time (lb) that is allocated to political
activities (lb). The remaining fraction of leisure time, 1  ; denotes the e¤ort to pass to the
o¤spring the cultural traits of the parent and is captured by the term T (lb) = (1  )lb: This
term is dened as imperfect empathy in the Bisin and Verdier model, and reects the fact
that the parent, while altruistic, prefers his own cultural trait and thus exerts some e¤ort to
transmit it to his child.
The last term of the utility function, PbbVbb+PbaVba; captures the fact that parents are
altruistic and gain utility from their o¤springsfuture socioeconomic activity, even if they do
not belong to the same cultural type. Vbb captures the expected utility of an o¤spring born
in a family of type b; who also manifests the trait b: Vba denotes the expected utility of an
o¤spring born in a family of type b; who manifests the trait a.
The probability to obtain the trait b while being raised in a family of the b type; is
given by Pbb = db(qb) + (1   db(qb))qb: Analytically, the child that is born in an immigrant
family may receive the same cultural trait as the parent via socialization within the family
with probability db(qb), where qi denotes the fraction of individuals who possess the trait
i. However there is a probability 1   db(qb), that the socialization within the family is not
5This result is in line with Luttmer and Singhal (2011) who argue that even if there was systematic selective
immigration, that would imply perfect alignment along preferences and thus it would be impossible to trace
any e¤ect of the origin country on immigrantsattitudes.
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successful. In that case, two things may happen: i) with probability qb the trait b is acquired
via indirect socialization with the community; or ii) with probability qa = 1  qb the trait a is
obtained. This implies that Pba = 1  Pbb = (1  db(qb))(1  qb).
Maximizing eq. (7) w.r.t. Ib yields:
lb =
 
1
Aa
(b( Ab;
b) + b( Ab;
b)Pbb + a( Aa;
a)Pba
[wb   (1  )] [1 + Pbb + Pba]
!1=2
> 0 if wb > (1  ) (9)
According to Bisin and Verdier (2001), for cultural transmission to take place the
following condition should hold,
@lb=@qb < 0; (10)
i.e., socialization within the family and indirect socialization within the community
should be substitutes.
Solving for the inequality yields
@lb
@qb
=
1
2
(lb )
 1=2
 
b( Ab;
b)  a( Aa; a)

P
0
bb
[wb   (1  )] [1 + Pbb + Pba] < 0 if b(
Ab; b) < a( Aa;
a) (11)
The inequality 11 yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Cultural Transmission of the Great Expectations E¤ect) Immigrants coming
from low institutional quality countries and who are more tolerant towards bad institutional
quality (i.e., b( Ab; b) < a( Aa; a)) can transmit their inated level of trust to their o¤-
springs, thus the Great Expectations e¤ect can be traced even to the second generation immi-
grants.
4 Data, Empirical Strategy and Selection
Proposition 1 of the model provides three clear testable hypotheses. First, whether there is an
e¤ect from the origin country institutions on immigrantstrust in host institutions. Second, on
whether there is an e¤ect of mean attitudes at the origin country on immigrantstrust in host
institutions. The empirical section augments this hypothesis and runs a horserace between
origin institutions and mean attitudes at the origin country in order to explore whether it is
institutions or culture that prevail. Last, whether immigrants from more corrupt countries
allocate more or less time in political activities.
11
The empirical section also addresses the ndings of Proposition 2, i.e., whether there is
cultural transmission to the second generation immigrants. Last, the ndings of the empirical
section, give an answer as to whether the results are driven by selective immigration or not.
4.1 The Data
The analysis employs data from ve waves of the European Social Survey (2004-2012), a
cross sectional survey conducted in a number of European countries.6 The ESS is a cross-
national survey that quanties the attitudes, beliefs and behavioral patterns of citizens in
more than thirty European countries. In particular the ESS sample comprises individuals
who currently reside in Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Kosovo, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and Ukraine.
One element in the construction of the dataset is that it provides an immigrant identier
that allows to trace immigrants up to the second generation, as well as concrete information
about the mothers and the fathers country of origin. This element is crucial since it allows
researchers to exploit the event of immigration in order to explore the evolution of cultural
traits. The identifying assumption in these studies is that when immigrants move to a
host country their current attitudes are no longer directly a¤ected by the economic or the
institutional environment at the country of origin. Thus, any e¤ect of the origin country on
immigrantsattitudes operates indirectly via culture (Fernández and Fogli, 2009).
The baseline analysis will rely on two sub-samples derived from the ESS: i) An extended
sample comprising immigrants from 134 countries who are moving to 34 European (ESS)
countries; and ii) a European sample comprising immigrants from 32 European (ESS) countries
who are moving to 34 European (ESS) countries. This distinction will serve two purposes.
First, to explore whether immigrants from di¤erent continents behave di¤erently compared
to European immigrants. Second, it will allow to explore whether it is home institutions or
mean attitudes at the origin country that have a stronger e¤ect on culture. Whereas the
measures of institutional quality are available for a large number of countries (e.g., the ICRG
corruption index is available from more than 130 countries), the measures of attitudes at the
origin country are available only for the 34 countries of the ESS.
Extended Sample: Immigrants from 134 Countries The analysis reports atti-
tudes of N=22997 rst and second generation immigrants, who originate from 134 countries
all over the globe and currently reside in 34 European countries. Tables C.1-C.5 describe the
immigration ows by birth country. The rst column in each table shows the country of origin,
6The rst wave is omitted as it does not provide the immigrant identier.
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Column (2) indicates the number of distinct destination countries in the sample, Column
(3) indicates the number of immigrants coming from each country of origin, Column (4)
indicates the most prevalent destination country, whereas the last column reveals the number
of immigrants that have immigrated to the most prevalent destination country. Similarly,
Table C.6 in the Appendix describes the immigration ows by destination country. The rst
column indicates the destination countries in the sample, Column (2) the number of distinct
birth countries of all immigrants that have participated in the ESS questionnaire, Column (3)
the total number of immigrants in each destination country, Column (4) the most prevalent
birth country and the last column the total number of immigrants coming from the most
prevalent country.
Using the immigrant identier, the sample of immigrants is distinguished between
rst and second generation migrants (N1 = 13007 and N2 = 9990 correspondingly). First
generation immigrants are dened as the individuals who themselves immigrated to the host
country, whereas second generation immigrants are dened as those individuals who were born
in the host country but whose fathers were born in a di¤erent country and eventually moved
to the host country. To identify the immigrantscountry of origin, the analysis employs the
individualscountry of origin for the rst generation immigrants and the fathers country of
origin for the second generation immigrants.7 The baseline analysis is conducted using the
total sample of immigrants in order to maximize the number of observations, however the
results are replicated for the sample of rst and second generation immigrants separately, in
order to mitigate selective immigration concerns (Table B.1).8
European Sample: Immigrants from 32 Countries The analysis reports atti-
tudes of N=14545 rst and second generation immigrants, who originate from 32 European
countries all over the globe and currently reside in 34 European countries. The construction
of this sample is identical to the extended sample.
The Variables The papers employes four alternative dependent variables, i.e., trust
in the i) parliament; ii) legal system; iii) politicians; and iv) political parties. Respondents are
given the question "Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally
trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and
10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]s....[parliament; legal system; politicians;
political parties]".
As far as interpersonal trust is concerned, respondents are given the statement "Gener-
ally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cant be too careful
7The results are robust to choosing the mothers country of origin instead. Results are reported in Table
B.4 in the robustness section.
8The issue of selective immigration is analyzed extensively in the following section.
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in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you cant be too
careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted".
The basic measure of institutional quality employed in the baseline analysis is the
ICRG index that ranges from 0 (least corrupt country) to 6 (most corrupt country). The
average of the years 1984-1986 is employed.9
The ESS also provides information about the age of the respondent, the gender,
employment and family status, the highest level of education achieved, level of income,
parental and spousal education, citizenship, belonging to a discriminated group or not, and
whether the individual voted or not in the last election.
Appendix A provides a detailed description of all the variables used in the baseline
analysis and the robustness section.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
The aim of the paper is to explore whether immigrants coming from corrupt countries tend
to inate their trust towards the institutions of the host country or whether they tend
to be distrustful towards institutions in general. To provide an answer to this question
the empirical analysis takes place in three stages. First it explores the e¤ect of origin
institutions on immigrantstrust towards host institutions. Second it runs a horserace between
origin institutions and mean attitudes at the origin country in order to explore whether it is
institutions or culture that prevail. Finally it explores the policy implications of the results.
Stage 1: The Persistent E¤ect of Institutions on Culture In the rst stage
the analysis explores the e¤ect of origin institutions on immigrantstrust.
The reduced form model is
Tjhit = 0 + 1Ci +2Ij +3h +4Tt + "jhit (12)
where T is an index of the level of trust of individual j; residing in the host country
h, with ancestry i, who participated in the tth ESS round. Four di¤erent measures of trust
are employed, i.e. trust in the parliament, in the legal system, in politicians and the political
parties. Ci is a measure of the quality of institutions at the ancestry country i: The analysis
controls for a vector of individual controls such as age, age square, gender, employment
and family status, and educational level.10 r is a vector of host country xed e¤ects that
9The vast majority of the immigrants in the sample left the country before 1990. Thus the choice of this
range is aimed to capture the earliest possible conditions of institutions at the origin country. This also justies
the choice of the ICRG measure as opposed to other corruption measures that are available only for later years.
However, as Table B.2 suggests the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of institutional quality
(e.g., Corruption Perception Index) and an alternative range of years.
10Tables B.6, B.3, B.5 and B.4 control for a multitude of additional individual and origin country controls
such as individual income, GDP at the origin country, citizenship, potential discrimination, the presence of
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captures all time invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the host country level. Tt is a vector
of ESS round xed e¤ects aimed to capture round specic shocks that could a¤ect individual
responses. "jri is an individual specic error term. The standard errors are corrected for
clustering at the dimension of the country of origin.11
The empirical results, presented in the next section, establish that 1 > 0; i.e., higher
corruption at the origin country is associated with higher trust towards institutions at the
host country. Interestingly, whereas residents of corrupt countries tend to mistrust their home
institutions, they tend to inate their trust towards foreign institutions as the analysis based
on the immigrant sample suggests.12
Stage 2: Horserace Regressions Between Institutional Quality and Mean
Attitudes at the Origin Country The second stage attempts a comparison between the
e¤ect of institutions at the origin country and mean attitudes at the origin country. Do they
both have an e¤ect on immigrants attitudes? Does this e¤ect go to the same direction? And
if not which of the two e¤ects prevails?
The estimated equation is
Tjhit = 0 + 1Ci + MPi +2Ij +3h +4Tt + "jhit (13)
where MPi denotes mean attitudes at the origin country with respect to each measure
of trust, i.e. mean trust in the parliament, the legal system, the politicians and the political
parties. The average attitudes are derived by the ESS sample after excluding all immigrants
who reside in each country. Therefore the analysis can be conducted only for the European
sample.
The results suggest the following: i) mean attitudes at home do not confer a statistically
signicant e¤ect on immigrants trust towards institutions, and ii) for three out of the four
measures (trust in the parliament, the politicians and the political parties) it is the measure of
institutional quality that prevails in the horserace, i.e., higher corruption at the origin country
is associated with higher trust towards institutions.
immigrant networks at the home country, etc. These controls are not included in the baseline analysis due
to the fact that the number of observations is signicantly reduced. The results remain robust under these
alternative specications.
11Double clustering at the dimension of i) the host and the origin country, and ii) the origin country and
the ESS round, yields similar results (results not reported in the paper).
12Table B.10 reports the results of estimating the following model:
Ti = 0 + 1Ci + "i; where Ti is the average level of nativestrust towards institutions in country i and
Ci is the level of corruption in country i: 1 < 0 suggesting that in a sample of natives, higher corruption
is associated with less trust towards institutions. This table reports mere correlations that highlight the
contradiction between trust towards native and foreign institutions. A formal analysis of native trust, which is
beyond the scope of the paper, would call for resolving the endogeneity problems. Crucially, in the immigrant
sample analysis, endogeneity is no longer a concern, particularly for the sample of 2nd generation immigrants.
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Stage 3: Policy Implications Last, the analysis explores the policy implications
of the rst hypothesis. In line with the argumentation of Aghion et al. (2010), the analysis
explores whether the trust of immigrants towards host institutions, partly triggered by the
bad institutions at the origin country, has an e¤ect on their demand for regulation and their
political attitudes. The reduced form model is
Rjhit = 0 + 1Ci +2Ij +3h +4Tt + "jhit (14)
where R is an index of the level of demand for regulation of individual j; residing in
host country h, with ancestry i, who participated in the t ESS round. Five di¤erent measures
of demand for regulation are employed, i.e. demand for strong government, attitudes towards
following rules, participation in political campaign, signing petitions and the level of interest
in local politics.13 Building on the rst stage of the analysis, which suggests that origin
institutions have an e¤ect on individual trust in host institutions, the analysis at this stage
employs corruption at the origin country as an exogenous determinant of individual trust.
The rest of the variables in the estimated equation are the same as in equation (13).
The results of the empirical analysis establish that higher corruption at the origin
country is associated with lower demand for regulation and less active political participation
of immigrants in the host country.
In all the three estimated models the identifying assumption for 1 is that there are
no omitted factors that are correlated with the average institutional quality at the origin
country that a¤ect the individuals trust towards institutions at the country of residence.14
Thus, anything at the origin country that has a persistent e¤ect on trust attitudes is falling
under the broad category of culture (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).
Moreover, to the extend that trust attitudes are a¤ected by time invariant factors present at
the host country they will be captured by the host country xed e¤ects.
Selection The major concern in all these studies that exploit the event of immigra-
tion is selective immigration. Selective immigration could be an issue for i) the identication
strategy as it would suggest that unobserved factors from the host country can a¤ect the
trust attitudes of immigrants directly (and not only indirectly through culture as this study
hypothesizes); and ii) whether the documented attitudes of the immigrants are representative
of those of the natives. Starting from the rst issue (i-identication), two main sources
of selective immigration are usually considered: a) preference based immigration; and b)
economically driven immigration. To resolve these two concerns the analysis employs two
approaches. First, as Luttmer and Singhal (2011) argue, the fact that immigrants from
13All the variables are analytically described in the Appendix.
14This is particularly true for the sample of 2nd generation immigrants who never actually lived in the origin
country. Table B.1 conrms the baseline results even for the sample of 2nd generation immigrants.
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many di¤erent countries move to a number of di¤erent European countries, makes it less
likely that there is systematically selective immigration along the dimension of trust. Even
if there was systematic selective immigration, that would imply perfect alignment along
preferences and thus it would be impossible to trace any e¤ect of the origin country on
immigrantsattitudes. The second approach is also reassuring as it exploits the sample of
second generation immigrants. Whereas this reduces the sample size signicantly, yet the fact
that these immigrants were born in the host country and never actually lived at the origin
country ensures that any e¤ect of the origin country on their attitudes operates via the culture
instilled to them by their parents. Even if the parents were a selected sample, this would no
longer pose any threat to the identication strategy since exogeneity would not be a concern.
Reassuringly the results on second generation immigrants conrm the ndings of the baseline
analysis.15
As far as the second issue is concerned (ii-representativeness),it does not interfere with
the aim of the paper which is primarily to document the trust level of immigrants towards for-
eign institutions, the determinants of these attitudes and to explore their policy implications.
In the context of a globalized world where extensive immigration is nowadays a fact, giving
an answer to these questions is crucial. Therefore, even if there is selective immigration, and
as long as it does not pose any identication concerns as already analyzed above, it would
be interesting to establish a novel dimension along which individuals immigrate, i.e., the
quality of institutions. On the other hand if indeed there is no selection issue, i.e., if it is
not the trustful immigrants that immigrate, then the results of the paper identify the trust of
individuals towards foreign institutions. As long as these individuals reside in their countries,
then their trust towards foreign institutions does not have any meaningful impact (and more
importantly we do not have this type of information in the ESS about the trust of natives
towards foreign institutions). However if these individuals immigrate (which is the case in
our analysis), then their trust towards these foreign institutions becomes important and has
a signicant e¤ect on their political participation in the host country.
One approach aimed to address this type of selection is conducted via using a sample
of pairs of groups of immigrants who reside in several host countries, e.g., Greek and German
groups who reside in Sweden and/or in France. The analysis using this bilateral sample
conrms the baseline ndings thus suggesting that even if Greek and German groups were
self-selected to Sweden, motivated by its very good institutional quality, the results in this
section are not driven by the fact that they are moving to Sweden. The unit of analysis is not
the immigrant group with respect to the native group, instead it is the rst immigrant group
(e.g., the Greeks) with respect to the second immigrant group (e.g., the Germans) who both
reside in Sweden. After netting out the e¤ect of host country, we can still identify the Great
15See Table B.1.
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Expectations e¤ect and thus claim that it is not driven by selection.
5 Empirical Findings
The empirical section is structured around the three stages outlined in the empirical imple-
mentation section.
5.1 Stage 1: The Persistent E¤ect of Institutions on Culture
Table 1 establishes that lower institutional quality in the origin country, measured by the
average level of corruption (ICRG), has a positive and signicant e¤ect on individual trust
in institutions in the host country. The analysis exploits the extended set of immigrants, i.e.
of 22997 rst and second generation immigrants, who have immigrated from 134 countries
to 34 European countries. In particular, four measures of trust in institutions are employed.
Column (1) explores the e¤ect of corruption at the origin country on immigrantstrust in the
parliament, Column (2) on trust in the legal system, Column (3) on trust in politicians and
Column (4) on trust in the political parties. The analysis controls for a number of individual
controls such as age, age square, gender, educational level , family and employment status. All
specications include a set of ESS round and of host country xed e¤ects. The former account
for time shocks and trends that are common to all European countries during the collection
of the data for each round, e.g. economic shocks. The latter capture all time invariant factors
that can a¤ect individual attitudes, which are related to host country conditions such as host
institutions and culture, geography, climate, etc.
The coe¢ cient on the quality of institutions is positive and highly signicant across all
specications. This implies that an increase in corruption at the origin country is associated
with an increase in the level of individual trust in host institutions. This inated trust is
referred to as theGreat Expectations e¤ect. As far as the magnitude of this e¤ect is concerned,
we get a better understanding from the Table B.7 which reports the beta coe¢ cients. The beta
coe¢ cients suggest that whereas age and higher education are the most crucial determinants
of immigrant trust, yet origin corruption is also quite important. For three of the measures
of trust (parliament, politicians and political parties) the coe¢ cient is around 0.07 suggesting
that an one standard deviation increase in origin corruption would lead to a 0.07 standard
deviation increase in trust towards each of the three institutions. Trust in the legal system is
less a¤ected by origin corruption.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
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Table 2 replicates the same results only for the European sample of immigrants. The
results are somewhat di¤erent since they highlight that it is only three out of the four measures
of trust that are a¤ected by origin institutions, i.e., parliament, politicians and political parties.
Trust in the legal system is no longer a¤ected by the origin institutions when it comes to the
European sample. This could reect the fact that either trust in the legal system is a¤ected
by other factors such as the stage of development or that individuals consider that the legal
system is independent of the political system and more immune to the presence of corruption.16
Table B.8 reports the beta coe¢ cients for the European sample.
Why are the results of Tables 1 and 2 interesting? Because they report a di¤erentiation
in the attitudes of individuals with respect to host and origin institutions. Table B.10 in
the Appendix reports that natives who live in corrupt countries tend to mistrust native
institutions.17 However as the results of this stage suggest, this is not the case when it
comes to foreign institutions. Based on the immigrant analysis, the ndings suggest that
immigrants overvalue the quality and their trust towards foreign institutions, particularly
when they come from very corrupt countries. In the absence of questions that would ask
natives to evaluate foreign institutions, the paper is agnostic as to whether this inated trust
pre-existed or whether it emerged upon the decision to immigrate.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
5.2 Stage 2: Horserace Regressions between Institutional Quality
and Mean Preferences at the Origin Country
Upon establishing the e¤ect of origin institutions on immigrant attitudes, the next step is to
explore whether mean attitudes at home also have an e¤ect. And if so, does this e¤ect have
the same direction as the e¤ect of institutions? In other words being a Greek immigrant in
Sweden do you tend to be mistrustful towards institutions (as the average Greek), or you tend
to overtrust Swedish institutions due to the fact that they are so much better than the Greek
ones (as the Great Expectations e¤ect suggests)?18
16The robustness section sheds some light on this results. Table B.3 controls for income per capita at the
origin country. Even for the extended sample of immigrants, income seems to be the only determinant of trust
in the legal system. On the other hand trust towards parliament, politicans and political parties is una¤ected
by the insertion of this control. Therefore this result indicates that trust in the legal system is more likely
a¤ected by the stage of development rather than the institutional quality.
17The table reports mere correlations that highlight the contradiction between trust towards native and
foreign institutions. A formal analysis of native trust, which is beyond the scope of the paper, would call for
resolving the endogeneity problems. Crucially in the immigrant sample analysis, endogeneity is no longer a
concern, particularly for the sample of 2nd generation immigrants.
18The importance of mean attitudes at the origin country has been highlighted by Luttmer and Singhal
(2011) who have established that preferences for redistribution at the home country are a signicant
determinant of preferences for redistribution of immigrants.
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Table 3 gives an answer to all these question by employing the sample of European
immigrants, for which we have information on their mean attitudes. Columns (1), (3), (5)
and (7) of Table 3 report the e¤ect of the mean attitudes at the origin country on immigrants
trust in the parliament, the legal system, politicians and in political parties respectively,
while controlling for the full set of controls and ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Interestingly the mean attitudes at the origin country do not confer a statistically signicant
e¤ect on immigrantstrust.
Running a horserace between origin institutions and mean attitudes (Columns (2), (4),
(6) and (8)) reveals that, with the exception of trust in the legal system (which was not in any
case signicant for the European sample), it is the e¤ect of native institutions that prevails
over native culture. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient and the signicance somewhat drops,
yet the results remain similar to those of Table 2.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
5.3 Stage 3: The E¤ect of the Great Expectations E¤ect on De-
mand for Regulation and Political Participation
In the presence of large scale immigration it is crucial to underline the policy implications
of the Great Expectations e¤ect. In line with Aghion et al. (2010), who suggest that more
trust is associated with less demand for regulation, it is explored whether the inated trust
of immigrants a¤ects their demand for regulation in the host country as well as their political
participation. Five policy measures are considered that reect to what extend immigrants: i)
prefer a strong government; ii) prefer to follow rules or to be more independent; iii) actively
participated in a political campaign by displaying campaign badge; (iv) signed a petition
during the last 12 months; and v) are interested in politics. The interpretation of the indices
in all ve cases indicates that higher values imply less demand for regulation.
Columns (1)-(5) of Table 4 employ the extended sample of immigrants to explore the
e¤ect of corruption at the origin country in each of these of these policy outcomes. The analysis
controls for the full set of controls. The coe¢ cients in all cases suggest that immigrants coming
from more corrupt countries are less willing to participate actively in politics and support the
presence of stronger governments. Similar results are obtained in Table 5 which employs the
sample of European immigrants.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
[TABLE 5 HERE]
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The analysis suggests that the e¤ect of origin corruption on individual demand for
regulation and political participation partly operates via its e¤ect on trust. Immigrants coming
from more corrupt countries, tend to trust host institutions more (as Stage 1 suggests) and
thus they demand for less regulation and are less active in politics (following the logic of Aghion
et al. (2010)). This result could operate via additional channels such as the likelihood that
they belong to a discriminated group (in which case individuals would be more constrained to
participate in politics). Thus the analysis in the robustness section explores this possibility by
introducing several controls that capture the stage of assimilation (Table B.9) and the results
remain una¤ected.19
6 Discussion
This section discusses several issues that allow for a better understanding of the Great
Expectations e¤ect. First, the analysis attempts to highlight the di¤erences between the
attitudes of immigrants with respect to trust towards institutions and interpersonal trust.
Whereas the literature on interpersonal trust is rather extensive this is not the case about
trust in institutions and their between comparison. The ndings of this section suggest that
there is no evidence of the Great Expectations e¤ect when interpersonal trust is considered.
Moreover the horserace between mean attitudes and institutional quality establishes that as
far as interpersonal trust is concerned, it is the mean attitudes at home that prevail. These
results are interesting since they highlight the contradiction between the two types of trust as
well as the factors that trigger them.
Second the analysis explores the source of the Great Expectations e¤ect, i.e. whether
it is driven by immigrants moving to high quality of institutions countries or vice versa. The
ndings from the baseline analysis (i.e., the European sample) as well as the additional tests
conducted in this section suggest that no particular group drives the results.
Last the analysis estimates a model of bilateral di¤erences in trust and explores whether
bilateral di¤erences in the quality of institutions at the origin countries can account for
bilateral di¤erences in trust in institutions (i.e., whether the di¤erences in trust between e.g.,
the Greeks and the Swedish who live in Luxembourg can be accounted for by the di¤erence
in the quality of institutions between Greece and Sweden). This approach allows to account
for an even larger number of unobservables via controlling not only for host but also for origin
country xed e¤ects. It also further addresses selection concerns. The baseline results remain
una¤ected.
19Moreover, it should be noted that three out of the ve measures (strong government, follow rules and
interest in politics) do not reect actual participation, instead they capture willingness to participate (which
would be immune to actual constraints).
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6.1 Trust in Institutions vs. Interpersonal Trust
The literature on interpersonal trust documents inertia in attitudes, i.e., immigrants coming
from countries where individuals are on average distrustful, tend to be distrustful even in
the host country (Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Similarly, the literature suggests that higher
corruption is associated with lower level of trust. This section explores this hypothesis using
the same sample used in the baseline analysis, in an attempt to draw the di¤erences between
interpersonal trust and trust in institutions.
Column (1) of Table 6 employs the extended sample of immigrants, as well as the full
set of controls, and establishes that higher corruption at the home country is associated with
lower interpersonal trust at the host country. This nding suggests that low institutional
quality at the home country is associated with lower levels of trust towards other individuals
in the host country. Columns (2) and (3) replicate the analysis using the samples of rst and
second generation immigrants respectively.
Table 7 restricts the analysis to the sample of European immigrants in order to further
explore the e¤ect of mean attitudes at the origin country. Column (1) reports the e¤ect of
mean trust at the origin country on the interpersonal trust of immigrants. The coe¢ cient
is positive and highly signicant conrming inertia of mean attitudes at home. Column (2)
reports the results of regressing interpersonal trust on the mean level of corruption at the
home country. The negative coe¢ cient suggests that higher corruption at the origin country
is associated with lower interpersonal trust at the host country. Column (3) runs the horserace
between the two, indicating that mean attitudes at home is the dominant determinant. All
three columns control for the full set of controls of the baseline analysis.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
The combined results of the two tables suggest that there are major di¤erences between
interpersonal trust and trust in institutions. Whereas corruption at the origin country rein-
forces trust in institutions at the host country, thus is not the case with respect to interpersonal
trust. In that case, higher corruption deteriorates the social ties and makes people less trustful
towards one another. A second major distinction is that interpersonal trust manifests inertia,
i.e., individuals coming from distrustful countries tend to replicate their home attitudes. On
the contrary when it comes to trust in institutions, mean attitudes at home do not confer a
statistically signicant e¤ect. The only factor that matters in that case is institutional quality
at the origin country. Overall, to summarize the ndings one could say that when immigrants
move to a new country they form Great Expectations about the host country institutions but
not about the people in the host country.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
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6.2 Source of the Great Expectations E¤ect: Immigrants Coming
from Countries with Better or Worse Institutions?
This section explores the source of the Great Expectations e¤ect, i.e. whether it originates
from immigrants that move from poor countries to richer countries or whether there is some
threshold level of development upon which the results do not hold. The analysis so far suggests,
that the stage of development does not play a signicant role. The rst evidence for this
comes from the sample of European immigrants, where the economic di¤erences are not very
pronounced, and in which case theGreat Expectations e¤ect is still present (with the exception
of trust in the legal system).
However to further elaborate on this question, the analysis in this section employs a
di¤erent approach. In particular it interacts the corruption variable with an ordered variable
of income per capita at the origin country. This variable has four gradations, as derived by
the denition of the World Bank. Table 8 replicates the baseline analysis, with the full set
of controls for the extended sample of immigrants, and introduces the interactive terms of
corruption with each gradation of income per capita. All the interactive terms are highly
signicant and positive, thus suggesting that the positive e¤ect of origin corruption on trust
attitudes is present under each income category. Note that the results are interpreted with
respect to the lowest income category, which is omitted and which refers to poor countries
with GDP p.c.< 1026 $ per year. The magnitude of the coe¢ cients perhaps suggests that this
e¤ect is stronger for countries whose income lies in the range between 4036 $<GDP<12476
$, but the di¤erences are not overly pronounced.
The fact that the corruption index comes as insignicant is not alarming as it cannot
be meaningfully interpreted in a regression that includes an interactive term. To properly test
whether origin corruption is still signicant after controlling for income per capita at home,
one should run the same regression without the interactive term. Table B.3 at the robustness
section establishes the robustness of the results to controlling for income per capita at the
origin country.
[TABLE 8 HERE]
6.3 Addressing the Issue of Selection and of Unobservable Hetero-
geneity at the Origin Country
This section aims to capture a larger number of unobservables associated not only with the
host country but also with the origin country via controlling for host country xed e¤ects.
Moreover it further addresses the issue of selection of immigrants towards countries with
high quality institutions. To achieve these goals, the analysis employs a sample of pairs of
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immigrants who reside in a third host country, i.e., pairs of Greeks and Germans who live in
Sweden and/or in France, etc. The question that is asked here is whether bilateral di¤erences
in trust can be explained by bilateral di¤erences in the quality of institutions.
The estimated model is given by
(Tg2   Tg1)h = 0 + 1(Cg2   Cg1)h +2h +3Ig1 + "hg1g2 (15)
where (Tg2   Tg1)h denotes the di¤erences in trust in institutions between the group
1 and group 2 (e.g., Greeks and Germans) who both reside in the host h (e.g., Sweden). Note
now that the analysis does not take place at the individual level, instead the unit of analysis
is the average level of trust of each group of immigrants. (Cg2 Cg1)h denotes the di¤erence
in corruption at the origin country of group 1 and group 2. r is a vector of host country xed
e¤ects that captures all time invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the host country level. Ig1
is an origin country xed e¤ect for group 1. "hg1g2 is a pair specic error term. The standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the dimension of the pairs of immigrant groups.
[TABLE 9 HERE]
Table 9 reports the results for each measure of trust while using a sample of 21962 pairs
of groups of immigrants who currently reside in 34 European countries. Columns (1), (3), (5)
and (7) report that the higher is the di¤erence in corruption between the origin countries of
groups 1 and 2, the higher are the di¤erences in the levels of trust in institutions. Columns
(2), (4), (6) and (8) replicate the same analysis while controlling for di¤erences in income per
capita at the origin country. The results are quite similar to the baseline analysis suggesting
that they are robust to the inclusion of this additional control. The only measure that does
not survive controlling for income per capita is trust in the legal system, as was the case in
the baseline analysis.
Overall the results of this section are reassuring as to the concerns about the selection
of immigrants. First the analysis accounts for most of the unobserved heterogeneity by
controlling for both host and origin country xed e¤ects. Second it suggests that selective
immigration is not the source of the Great Expectations e¤ect. The bilateral analysis does no
longer derive the Great Expectations e¤ect by comparing the group of immigrants to that of
natives in the host country. This approach could be susceptible to selection since one could
argue that immigrants moved to the host country because they trusted its institutions from
the outset. The current analysis compares pairs of immigrants within a given host country.
Thus even if the Greeks and the Germans moved to Sweden motivated by its good institutions,
this approach can net out this e¤ect. The remaining di¤erences in their between levels of trust
are thus partly driven by the Great Expectations e¤ect.
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7 Robustness
The robustness section establishes the robustness of the baseline analysis (extended sample of
all immigrants) to a number of alternative specications and assumptions such as additional
individual and country of origin controls, the use of alternative measures of institutional
quality, the validity of the results for the rst and second generation immigrants, as well as
placebo tests.
7.1 First and Second Generation Immigrants
Table B.1 reports the results of the baseline analysis for rst and second generation migrants.
This approach allows to trace the cultural transmission mechanism and to mitigate selection
concerns related to identication issues. As was the case in the baseline analysis, the country
of origin is that of the individual for rst generation immigrants and that of their father for
the second generation immigrants.
As expected, the results for both the rst generation immigrants (Table B.1-Row I) and
the second generation immigrants (Table B.1-Row II) are quite similar to the baseline analysis.
The coe¢ cients for each of the four measures of trust are positive and highly signicant thus
establishing the strength and more importantly the transmission of the Great Expectations
e¤ect. Reassuringly the coe¢ cients for the sample of second generation immigrants are lower
thus implying that the intensity of the e¤ect dissipates over time.
[TABLE B.1 HERE]
7.2 Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality and Periods
This section establishes the robustness of the baseline analysis to the use of two alternative
measures of institutional quality, e.g. the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the WGI
measure on control of corruption (CC). Moreover the two measures are employed for di¤erent
periods as well, i.e. the CPI measure is constructed as the average of the period 1995-2000,
whereas the CC measure is the 2000 value.
Table B.2 reports the results of this robustness check. Row I reports the ICRG
coe¢ cients, whereas Row II reports the CC coe¢ cients. In both cases the results remain
una¤ected with only minor changes on the magnitude of the coe¢ cients.
[TABLE B.2 HERE]
The results of Table B.2 are reassuring as to concerns that are inherent in the estimation
of the corruption, i.e., the fact that they build on perception measures and could be subjected
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to sharp movements in the presence of important events, e.g. a scandal. This concern is already
addressed by taking the average of three years, an approach that smooths out the e¤ect of
temporary shocks. However this e¤ect is further mitigated by using alternative measures, such
as the CPI or the WGI aggregated for di¤erent periods. Moreover, in line with the Fernández
and Fogli (2009) argument, to the extend that culture is slowly evolving, one should be able
to nd a signicant e¤ect of home conditions on cultural attitudes of migrants even if home
conditions are measured at a later period. Similarly for the institutional quality measures,
whereas they reect perceptions and are thus vulnerable to shocks, nevertheless it is plausible
to argue that e.g., Greece would systematically report higher corruption than Sweden.
7.3 Additional Controls from the Origin Country
The concern about unobservables associated with the origin country has extensively been
addressed in the discussion section in the context of the bilateral analysis. The bilateral
analysis employs not only host but also origin country xed e¤ects. However in the context
of the baseline analysis another approach is adopted, i.e. controlling for income per capita
at the origin country. The measure of income is the mean of the period 1950-1990 so as to
mitigate the e¤ect of short term uctuations and to reect the overall stage of development
of the country in the early years where many immigrants left the country.
[TABLE B.3 HERE]
The results reported in Table B.3 suggest that higher income per capita is negatively
and signicantly correlated with trust in the host country. Thus individuals coming from
developed countries, and thus more likely from countries with good institutions tend to be
less trustful towards native institutions. Nevertheless, the e¤ect of corruption at the home
country is still highly signicant and positive, with somewhat smaller coe¢ cients that in the
baseline analysis, suggesting that the e¤ect of corruption partly operates via income. The
only variable which does not survive controlling for income, is trust in the legal system. One
explanation could be that the legal system is more closely related to the evolution of the
economy and less related to political institutions such as the parliament, the parties and
the politicians. This conviction is reinforced even in the bilateral analysis (Table 9) and the
discussion on the source of the Great Expectations e¤ect (Table 8).
7.4 Alternative Specications
This section establishes the robustness of the baseline analysis to a number of alternative
specications. Row I of Table B.4 introduces a number of controls that capture the assimilation
process of immigrants. These controls are: i) citizenship, ii) the right to vote, iii) duration
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of stay, iv) whether individuals belong to a discriminated group. These controls are plausible
only for the sample of second generation immigrants thus the analysis is restricted to them
only. The coe¢ cients remain una¤ected with the exception of the coe¢ cient on trust in the
legal system.
Row II employs the extended sample of rst and second generation immigrants and
augments the analysis with controls on mothers, fathers and spouses education. It also in-
troduces controls on the employment status of the father and the mother (when the individual
was at age 14). Both the magnitude and the signicance of the coe¢ cients remain una¤ected.
Row III conducts placebo regressions by allocating randomly di¤erent levels of corrup-
tion to immigrants, i.e., associating the trust of a Greek immigrant with the corruption level
of e.g., Germany. Reassuringly the coe¢ cient on the placebo corruption comes everywhere
insignicant.
Row IV conducts weighted regressions, taking into account the particular weight asso-
ciated with each immigrant. The results remain una¤ected.
Finally Row V regresses associates each second generation immigrant with the country
of origin of his mother (instead of the origin of the father as was the case in the baseline
analysis). Similarly, the magnitude and the signicance of the coe¢ cients remains unchanged.
[TABLE B.4 HERE]
Table B.5 augments the baseline analysis using a measure of the intensity of networks
of the same origin in the host country. To construct this measure the analysis controls for the
number of immigrants of the same origin who reside in each host country, i.e., the number
of Greeks who reside in Sweden.20 Interestingly the coe¢ cient on networks is negative and
signicant for three out of the four variables (legal system, politicians and parties). The
interpretation of this coe¢ cient suggests that the larger a network is, the less trustful is
the immigrant. One possible interpretation is that larger networks delay the assimilation
process of an immigrant. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cients on corruption remain una¤ected thus
suggesting that the presence of networks does not mitigate the e¤ect of origin corruption on
the trust levels of immigrants.
[TABLE B.5 HERE]
Finally, Table B.6 augments the baseline analysis with xed e¤ects for 12 income
categories. Overall the results suggest that higher income is associated with higher trust
towards institutions, without though a¤ecting the coe¢ cients on corruption.
20The number is derived from the ESS.
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8 Conclusion
This research establishes the persistent e¤ect of institutions on culture exploiting the event of
immigration. It theoretically and empirically advances the hypothesis that lower institutional
quality at the origin country of an immigrant is associated with higher trust towards host
country institutions. The "inated" trust of migrants is documented as theGreat Expectations
e¤ect and is interesting for several reasons. First it contradicts with the empirically observed
attitude of migrants with respect to interpersonal trust, where low quality of institutions is
associated with lower interpersonal trust in both the host and the home country. Second, the
"inated" trust persists for both rst and second generation migrants, despite the fact that
the former are not fully assimilated and thus partially excluded from these institutions and
the latter have no direct interaction with the origin institutions. Third, the e¤ect of origin
institutions is stronger than the e¤ect of mean trust at home conrming that it is institutions
that prevail over culture and not culture as represented by the average attitude at the origin
country.
The formation of Great Expectations has profound policy implications. The analysis
establishes that higher corruption at the origin country is associated with less demand for
regulation and less active participation in domestic politics. These ndings further highlight
the interplay between culture and institutions as is operating via immigration.
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Table 1: Great Expectations: The E¤ect of (Origin) Institutions on Immigrants Trust in
Host Institutions-World Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Political Parties
Corruption (Origin) 0.138*** 0.090*** 0.129*** 0.131***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017)
Age -0.044*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.042***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Age Square 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women -0.093* -0.086** 0.032 0.014
(0.050) (0.043) (0.035) (0.029)
Education (Lower Secondary) 0.064 0.099* 0.028 0.033
(0.069) (0.059) (0.069) (0.064)
Education (Upper Secondary) 0.089 -0.002 -0.102* -0.086
(0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.058)
Lower Tertiary 0.112 -0.010 -0.052 -0.038
(0.141) (0.164) (0.111) (0.130)
Higher Tertiary 0.562*** 0.517*** 0.174** 0.136*
(0.079) (0.088) (0.078) (0.076)
Unemployment -0.375*** -0.347*** -0.291*** -0.291***
(0.083) (0.072) (0.085) (0.081)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 134 134 134 134
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34
Obs. 22997 22997 22997 22997
R-sq. 0.153 0.159 0.141 0.136
Summary: This table establishes the presence of the Great Expectations e¤ect, for
the world sample of immigrants. Analytically, the trust of immigrants in: i) the
parliament, ii) the legal system, iii) the politicians, and iv) the political parties
increases with the level of corruption at the origin country. The analysis controls
for individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level, family
and employment status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-
6 with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in Parliament",
"Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties"
refer to the host country and take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at
the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 2: Great Expectations: The E¤ect of (Origin) Institutions on Immigrants Trust in
Host Institutions-European Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Political Parties
Corruption (Origin) 0.101*** 0.051 0.074*** 0.056**
(0.022) (0.034) (0.026) (0.027)
Age -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.042*** -0.042***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Age Square 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women -0.057 -0.053 0.061 0.032
(0.069) (0.051) (0.041) (0.035)
Education (Lower Secondary) 0.042 0.033 -0.022 -0.043
(0.090) (0.087) (0.081) (0.088)
Education (Upper Secondary) 0.111 0.017 -0.088 -0.149**
(0.072) (0.083) (0.066) (0.073)
Lower Tertiary 0.066 -0.133 -0.083 -0.140
(0.165) (0.180) (0.123) (0.152)
Higher Tertiary 0.585*** 0.476*** 0.191* 0.061
(0.100) (0.109) (0.101) (0.096)
Unemployment -0.404*** -0.500*** -0.281** -0.297***
(0.112) (0.084) (0.107) (0.101)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 32 32 32 32
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34
Obs. 14545 14545 14545 14545
R-sq. 0.169 0.192 0.152 0.139
Summary: This table establishes the presence of the Great Expectations e¤ect, for
the sample of European immigrants. Analytically, the trust of migrants in: i) the
parliament, ii) the legal system, iii) the politicians, and in iv) the political parties
increases with the level of corruption at the origin country. The analysis controls for
individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level, family
and employment status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-
6 with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in Parliament",
"Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties"
refers to host institutions and take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at
the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 3: Great Expectations: The Persistent E¤ect of (Origin) Institutions or (Origin)
Attitudes? Horcerace Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Parties
Mean Trust (Origin) -0.017 0.012 0.039 0.074 -0.066 0.017 -0.037 0.035
(0.063) (0.041) (0.043) (0.039) (0.048) (0.059) (0.041) (0.048)
Corruption (Origin) 0.110*** 0.088* 0.086** 0.080**
(0.028) (0.043) 0.086** (0.032)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Obs. 14133 14133 14133 14133 14133 14133 14133 14133
R-sq. 0.170 0.172 0.195 0.196 0.153 0.153 0.140 0.141
Summary: This table establishes that the e¤ect of institutions at the origin country is stronger
than the e¤ect of mean attitudes at the origin country. The analysis conducts horserace regressions
while controlling for individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level,
family and employment status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-6 with
6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in Parliament", "Trust in the
Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties" take values from 0-10
with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) The attitude at the origin
country is estimated as the average attitude of the natives in the origin country for each type of
trust; (iv) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are
reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5
percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 4: The Policy Implications of the Great Expectations E¤ect-World Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strong Follow Displayed Signed Interested
Government Rules Campaign Badge Petition in Politics
Corruption (Origin) -0.079*** -0.111*** 0.004** 0.023*** -0.011***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Age -0.006** -0.004 0.001** -0.004*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Square 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women -0.091*** 0.051*** -0.006* -0.009* -0.130***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Education (Lower Secondary) -0.031 0.138*** -0.012** -0.036*** 0.079***
(0.036) (0.045) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013)
Education (Upper Secondary) -0.005 0.179*** -0.020*** -0.086*** 0.175***
(0.037) (0.043) (0.005) (0.015) (0.012)
Lower Tertiary 0.049 0.182*** -0.014** -0.088*** 0.218***
(0.044) (0.062) (0.006) (0.018) (0.020)
Higher Tertiary 0.146*** 0.310*** -0.050*** -0.166*** 0.324***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.006) (0.022) (0.013)
Unemployment -0.008 0.021 0.010 0.021** -0.021*
(0.029) (0.034) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 135 135 135 135 135
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34 34
Obs. 24863 24863 24863 24863 24863
R-sq. 0.089 0.086 0.048 0.101 0.118
Summary: This table establishes that higher corruption at the origin country is associated
with lower demand for regulation and lower political participation in the host country. The
analysis controls for individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level,
family and employment status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-6 with 6
indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) Strong Governmentindicates to what extend individuals
agree with the statement "government is strong and ensures safety". The variable takes values from
1 to 6 with 1 denoting Very much like meand 6 denoting Not like me at all; (iii) Follow Rules
indicates to what extend individuals agree with the statement " Important to do what is told and
follow rules". The variable takes values from 1 to 6 with 1 denoting Very much like me and
6 denoting Not like me at all; (iv) "Displayed Campaign Badge" corresponds to the question
Worn or displayed campaign badge/stick in the last 12 months . The variable is binary with 1
denoting Yesand 2 denoting No; (v) Signed Petitioncorresponds to the question During
the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Firstly...Signed a petition. The variable is
binary with 1 denoting Yesand 2 denoting No; (vi) Interested in Politicscorresponds to the
question How interested would you say you are in politicswith 1 denoting Very Interestedand
4 denoting Hardly Interested; (vii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension
of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (viii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the
1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis
tests.
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Table 5: The Policy Implications of the Great Expectations E¤ect-European Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strong Follow Displayed Signed Interested
Government Rules Campaign Badge Petition in Politics
Corruption (Origin) -0.083*** -0.131*** 0.009*** 0.036*** -0.029***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Age -0.005* -0.001 0.001 -0.004*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Square 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women -0.116*** 0.042** -0.009** -0.018** -0.127***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Education (Lower Secondary) -0.015 0.123** -0.013* -0.033* 0.080***
(0.052) (0.060) (0.007) (0.019) (0.014)
Education (Upper Secondary) 0.017 0.143** -0.018*** -0.081*** 0.170***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.006) (0.025) (0.015)
Lower Tertiary 0.118* 0.170* -0.012 -0.088*** 0.211***
(0.063) (0.087) (0.007) (0.030) (0.025)
Higher Tertiary 0.206** 0.296*** -0.045*** -0.154*** 0.327***
(0.082) (0.070) (0.007) (0.034) (0.018)
Unemployment 0.015 0.036 0.006 0.007 -0.025
(0.037) (0.037) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 32 32 32 32 32
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34 34
Obs. 15862 15862 15862 15862 15862
R-sq. 0.103 0.086 0.051 0.114 0.125
Summary: This table establishes that higher corruption in the origin country is
associated with lower demand for regulation and lower political participation in
the host country (sample of European immigrants). The analysis controls for
individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level and
employment status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-6
with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) Strong Government indicates to what extend
individuals agree with the statement "government is strong and ensures safety". The variable
takes values from 1 to 6 with 1 denoting Very much like meand 6 denoting Not like me at all;
(iii) Follow Rulesindicates to what extend individuals agree with the statement " Important to
do what is told and follow rules". The variable takes values from 1 to 6 with 1 denoting Very
much like meand 6 denoting Not like me at all; (iv) "Displayed Campaign Badge" corresponds
to the question Worn or displayed campaign badge/stick in the last 12 months . The variable
is binary with 1 denoting Yes and 2 denoting No; (v) Signed Petition corresponds to the
question During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Firstly...Signed a
petition. The variable is binary with 1 denoting Yes and 2 denoting No; (vi) Interested
in Politics corresponds to the question How interested would you say you are in politicswith
1 denoting Very Interested and 4 denoting Hardly Interested; (vii) Robust standard error
estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (viii)
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 6: Discussion: The Great Expectations E¤ect is not Present in the Case of
Interpersonal Trust (World Sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Interpersonal Trust
All Migrants First Generation Second Generation
Corruption (Origin) -0.089*** -0.114*** -0.045*
(0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
Age -0.017*** -0.005 -0.030***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
Age Square 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women -0.072 -0.110** -0.034
(0.048) (0.052) (0.047)
Education (Lower Secondary) 0.163** 0.192** 0.069
(0.069) (0.086) (0.138)
Education (Upper Secondary) 0.297*** 0.279*** 0.286**
(0.070) (0.074) (0.123)
Lower Tertiary 0.539*** 0.596*** 0.432***
(0.091) (0.109) (0.147)
Higher Tertiary 0.945*** 0.880*** 1.008***
(0.093) (0.117) (0.113)
Employment -0.309*** -0.313*** -0.316***
(0.068) (0.085) (0.111)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 134 131 111
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34
Obs. 22939 13007 9968
R-sq. 0.095 0.163 0.123
Summary:.This table establishes that higher corruption at the origin country
is associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust at the host country.
Therefore the Great Expectations e¤ect does not hold for the case of
interpersonal trust. The analysis controls for individual characteristics
such as age, age square, gender, educational level, family and employment
status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index
takes values from 0-6 with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Interpersonal Trust" corresponds to the question "Most people can be
trusted or you cant be too careful". The variable takes values from 0 to 10
with 0 denoting "Cant be too careful" and 10 denoting "Most people can be
trusted"; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of
the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical
signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 7: Discussion: Interpersonal Trust - The Persistent E¤ect of (Origin) Institutions or
of Mean (Origin) Attitudes?
(1) (2) (3)
Interpersonal Trust
Mean Preference (Origin) 0.194*** 0.160***
(0.032) (0.037)
Corruption (Origin) -0.129*** -0.043
(0.040) (0.035)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 32 32 32
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34
Obs. 14095 14511 14095
R-sq. 0.116 0.115 0.116
Summary: This table establishes that the e¤ect of mean
trust at the origin country is stronger than the e¤ect
of origin institutions. The analysis conducts horserace
regressions between home institutions and attitudes while
controlling for individual characteristics such as age, age
square, gender, educational level, family and employment
status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index.
The index takes values from 0-6 with 6 indicating the most
corrupt country; (ii) "Interpersonal Trust" corresponds to
the question "Most people can be trusted or you cant
be too careful". The variable takes values from 0 to 10
with 0 denoting "Cant be too careful" and 10 denoting
"Most people can be trusted"; (iii) The mean preferences
of the origin country are estimated by taking the weighted
averaging of the native preferences; (iv) Robust standard
error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of
origin, are reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical
signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis
tests.
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Table 8: Discussion: Does the Stage of Development A¤ect the Presence of the Great
Expectations E¤ect?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Parties
Corruption (Origin) -0.045 -0.064 -0.007 -0.006
(0.042) (0.045) (0.037) (0.039)
Corruption X GDP (1026<GDP<4036) 0.111 0.043 0.102 0.094
(0.033) (0.036) (0.028) (0.031)
Corruption X GDP (4036<GDP<12476) 0.165 0.121 0.139 0.134
(0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029)
Corruption X GDP (GDP>12476) 0.160 0.132 0.116 0.114
(0.036) (0.035) (0.029) (0.030)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 124 124 124 124
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34
Obs. 21156 21156 21156 21156
R-sq. 0.153 0.158 0.145 0.141
Summary: This table establishes that the stage of development
does not a¤ected the presence of the Great Expectations e¤ect.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from
0-6 with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in Parliament",
"Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties" take
values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii)
GDP is per capita GDP in constant 2000 US$ and is the average of the years 1950-1970;
The classications of GDP follow the classication suggested by the World Bank; iv)
Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are
reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at
the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 9: Robustness: Controlling for Host and Origin Country FE in a Sample of Pairs of
Immigrant Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Di¤erences in Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Parties
Di¤s. in Corruption 0.095 0.058 0.045 -0.008 0.067 0.028 0.077 0.033
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Di¤s in Log Income p.c -0.052 -0.069 -0.063 -0.071
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Obs. 100031 92553 101262 93703 100979 93431 100491 92969
R-sq. 0.114 0.122 0.112 0.120 0.106 0.112 0.106 0.112
Summary: This table establishes the presence of the Great Expectations e¤ect while controlling for
both host and origin country xed e¤ects. To conduct this analysis the table employs a sample
of pairs of immigrant groups residing in each host country. The results conrm that di¤erences
in the levels of trust of di¤erent immigrant groups are driven by di¤erences in origin institutional
quality. The analysis controls for all baseline controls and for income per capita at the origin country
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-6 with 6 indicating
the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in Parliament", "Trust in the Legal System", "Trust
in Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties" take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) GDP is per capita GDP in constant 2000 US$ and is the
average of the years 1950-1970; (iv) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the
country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Appendices
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A Variable Denitions and Sources
This section provides an analytical overview of all the variables employed in the analysis.
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A.1 ESS Variables
Outcome Variables
Trust in Parliament. "Trust in Parliament" corresponds to the question Using this card, please
tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means
you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]s
parliament?
Mean Trust in Parliament. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
Trust in the Legal System. "Trust in the Legal System" corresponds to the question Using this
card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read
out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly
[country]s legal system?
Mean Trust in Legal System. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
Trust in Politicians. "Trust in Politicians" corresponds to the question Using this card, please
tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means
you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]s
politicians?
Mean Trust in Politicians. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
Trust in Parties. "Trust in Political Parties" corresponds to the question Using this card, please
tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means
you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]s
political parties?
Mean Trust in Parties. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking the
weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
Intepresonal Trust. "Interpersonal Trust" corresponds to the question "Most people can be trusted
or you cant be too careful". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with 0 denoting "Cant be too
careful" and 10 denoting "Most people can be trusted".
Mean Interpersonal Trust. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
Satisfaction Economy. "Satisfaction with the Economy" corresponds to the question "How
satised with present state of economy in country". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with 0
denoting "extremely dissatised" and 10 denoting "extremely satised".
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Strong Government.. Strong Governmentindicates to what extend individuals agree with the
statement "government is strong and ensures safety". The variable takes values from 1 to 6 with 1
denoting Very much like meand 6 denoting Not like me at all.
Follow Rules.. Follow Rules indicates to what extend individuals agree with the statement "
Important to do what is told and follow rules". The variable takes values from 1 to 6 with 1 denoting
Very much like meand 6 denoting Not like me at all.
Displayed Campaign Badge.. "Displayed Campaign Badge" corresponds to the question Worn
or displayed campaign badge/stick in the last 12 months . The variable is binary with 1 denoting
Yesand 2 denoting No.
Petition. Signed Petitioncorresponds to the question During the last 12 months, have you done
any of the following? Firstly...Signed a petition. The variable is binary with 1 denoting Yesand
2 denoting No.
Inerested in Politics. Interested in Politicscorresponds to the question How interested would
you say you are in politicswith 1 denoting Very Interestedand 4 denoting Hardly Interested.
Individual Controls
Age. The age of the respondent.
Gender. The gender of the respondent.
Family Status. Family status is a binary variable taking the value 0 if the individual lives with a
partner and 1 otherwise.
Employment Status. Employment status is a binary variable taking the value 0 if the individual
is employed and 1 otherwise.
Level of Education. The higher level of education attained by the respondent. The questionnaire
distinguishes seven di¤erent levels of education (less than lower secondary, lower secondary, lower tier
upper secondary, upper tier upper secondary, advanced vocational, lower tertiary BA level, higher
tertiary > MA level).
Parental and Spouse Educational Level. The higher level of education attained by the respon-
dentsfather, mother and spouse. The questionnaire distinguishes seven di¤erent levels of education
(less than lower secondary, lower secondary, lower tier upper secondary, upper tier upper secondary,
advanced vocational, lower tertiary BA level, higher tertiary > MA level).
Individual Income. Individual income measures the reported income of the immigrant. The
variable has 12 gradations.
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A.2 Aggregate Variables
Corruption. "Corruption" is using the ICRG index that ranges from 0 (least corrupt country) to
6 (most corrupt country). The average value of the years 1986-1990 is employed. The measure has
been modied compared to the original one to facilitate interpretation.
Corruption. CPI Corruptionis using the Corruption Perception Index. The index takes values
from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country. The measure has been modied compared
to the original one to facilitate interpretation.
Control of Corruption. "Control of Corruption" is measured by the World Governance Indicators
measure. The index ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. The measure
has been modied compared to the original one to facilitate interpretation.
GDP per Capita. Log GDP per capita comes from the WDI and denotes the average level of
income per capita of the origin country for the period 1950-1990.
Immigrant Networks. The "Immigrant Networks" variable measure the number of immigrants of
the same origin residing in each host country as derived by rounds 2-6 of the ESS;
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B Robustness
This section provides an analytical overview of the robustness checks.
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Table B.1: Robustness: First and Second Generation Immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Dep. Var: Parliament Legal System Politicians Parties Obs Host C. Origin C. Controls
Corruption (O)
I. First Gen. Migs 0.154*** 0.088*** 0.152*** 0.158*** 13007 34 131 Yes
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021)
II. Second Gen. Migs 0.087*** 0.068*** 0.060** 0.060*** 9990 34 111 Yes
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022)
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the results to the use of the samples of rst and
second generation immigrants respectively. The analysis controls for the full set of baseline controls.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-6 with 6 indicating
the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in Parliament", "Trust in the Legal System", "Trust
in Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties" take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the
country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level,
** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table B.2: Robustness: Alternative Measures of Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Parties Obs Host C. Origin C. Controls.
I. CPI 0.082*** 0.046*** 0.068*** 0.066*** 24536 34 171 Yes
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010)
II. CC 0.158*** 0.095*** 0.139*** 0.133*** 24517 34 135 Yes
(0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020)
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the baseline re-
sults to the use of alternative measures of institutional quality.
Notes: (i) CPI is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The index takes values from 0-10
with 10 indicating the most corrupt country. The index is the average of the years 1995-2000; (ii) The
measure CC denotes "Control of Corruption" and takes values between -2.5 and 2.5 with 2.5 denoting the
most corrupt country; (iii) "The variables "Trust in Parliament", "Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in
Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties" take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iv) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the
country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
Table B.3: Robustness: Controlling for Income per Capita of the Origin Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Parties
Corruption (Origin) 0.066*** 0.021 0.070*** 0.060***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.022) (0.022)
Log GDP per Capita (Origin) -0.149*** -0.147*** -0.120*** -0.136***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.025) (0.026)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 124 124 124 124
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34
Obs. 21156 21156 21156 21156
R-sq. 0.152 0.158 0.145 0.141
Summary: This table establishes the presence of the Great Expectations e¤ect, for the
sample of all immigrants, while controlling for income per capita at the origin country.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-6
with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in Parliament",
"Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties"
take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete
trust"; (iii) GDP is per capita GDP in constant 2000 US$ and is the average of the
years 1950-1970; iv) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the
country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for
two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table B.4: Robustness: Alternative Specications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Parties Obs Host C. Origin C. Controls
I. Assimilation 0.154*** 0.049 0.112*** 0.099*** 7643 34 32 Yes
(0.032) (0.043) (0.034) (0.036)
II. Parental and 0.120*** 0.075*** 0.108*** 0.116*** 18538 34 134 Yes
Spouse Controls (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019)
III. Placebo -0.021 -0.021 -0.004 -0.004 21532 34 134 Yes
Regressions (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
IV. Weighted 0.139 0.090 0.129 0.131 22997 34 134 Yes
Regressions (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
V. Mothers 0.142 0.095 0.135 0.134 18053 34 133 Yes
Origin (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the baseline analysis to a number of alternative specica-
tions.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-6 with 6
indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in Parliament", "Trust in the Legal
System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties" take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting
"no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the
dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical signicance at
the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis
tests.
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Table B.5: Robustness: Controlling for Networks of Immigrants of the Same Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Parties
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.128 0.076 0.123 0.126
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018)
Imigrant Networks -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 133 133 133 133
No. of Host Countries 33 33 33 33
Obs. 17722 17722 17722 17722
R-sq. 0.152 0.153 0.139 0.133
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the
results while controlling for GDP at the origin country.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-6
with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in Parliament",
"Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the Political Parties"
take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(iii) The "immigrant networks" variable measure the number of immigrants of the same
origin residing in each host country as derived by rounds 2-6 of the ESS; (iv) GDP is per
capita GDP in constant 2000 US$ and is the average of the years 1950-1970; iv) Robust
standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported
in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5
percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table B.6: Robustness: Controlling for Individual Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Political Parties
Corruption (Origin) 0.153 0.098 0.139 0.140
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018)
Income Scale 1 0.203 0.373 0.176 0.182
(0.089) (0.111) (0.082) (0.087)
Income Scale 2 0.256 0.378 0.151 0.178
(0.098) (0.131) (0.099) (0.090)
Income Scale 3 0.290 0.398 0.271 0.280
(0.092) (0.106) (0.098) (0.100)
Income Scale 4 0.312 0.506 0.224 0.218
(0.098) (0.122) (0.094) (0.096)
Income Scale 5 0.357 0.429 0.179 0.190
(0.109) (0.124) (0.097) (0.094)
Income Scale 6 0.315 0.575 0.213 0.170
(0.117) (0.139) (0.103) (0.094)
Income Scale 7 0.396 0.590 0.201 0.212
(0.101) (0.127) (0.099) (0.100)
Income Scale 9 0.473 0.641 0.260 0.264
(0.115) (0.135) (0.100) (0.095)
Income Scale 10 0.649 0.925 0.316 0.334
(0.132) (0.157) (0.101) (0.093)
Income Scale 11 0.440 0.685 0.421 0.456
(0.165) (0.226) (0.199) (0.178)
Income Scale 12 0.740 0.844 0.655 0.546
(0.266) (0.251) (0.263) (0.269)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 133 133 133 133
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34
Obs. 17005 17005 17005 17005
R-sq. 0.163 0.157 0.139 0.136
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of
the results to controlling for individual income.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values
from 0-6 with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in
Parliament", "Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the
Political Parties" take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10
denoting "complete trust"; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the
dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table B.7: How Strong is the Great Expectations E¤ect Compared to Other Determinants:
Beta Coe¢ cients for the World Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Political Parties
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.074 0.048 0.070 0.071
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017)
Age -0.326 -0.291 -0.266 -0.309
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Age Square 0.336 0.281 0.287 0.301
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women -0.019 -0.018 0.007 0.003
(0.050) (0.043) (0.035) (0.029)
Education (Lower Secondary) 0.010 0.015 0.004 0.005
(0.069) (0.059) (0.069) (0.064)
Education (Upper Secondary) 0.018 -0.000 -0.021 -0.017
(0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.058)
Lower Tertiary 0.010 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003
(0.141) (0.164) (0.111) (0.130)
Higher Tertiary 0.109 0.100 0.034 0.026
(0.079) (0.088) (0.078) (0.076)
Unemployment -0.037 -0.034 -0.029 -0.029
(0.083) (0.072) (0.085) (0.081)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 134 134 134 134
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34
Obs. 22997 22997 22997 22997
R-sq. 0.153 0.159 0.141 0.136
Summary: This table reports the beta coe¢ cient in order to compare
how strong is the Great Expectations e¤ect compared to others.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values
from 0-6 with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in
Parliament", "Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the
Political Parties" take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10
denoting "complete trust"; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the
dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table B.8: How Strong is the Great Expectations E¤ect Compared to Other Determinants:
Beta Coe¢ cients for the European Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Political Parties
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.047 0.023 0.035 0.026
(0.022) (0.034) (0.026) (0.027)
Age -0.396 -0.363 -0.322 -0.321
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Age Square 0.413 0.344 0.355 0.326
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women -0.012 -0.011 0.013 0.007
(0.069) (0.051) (0.041) (0.035)
Education (Lower Secondary) 0.006 0.005 -0.003 -0.007
(0.090) (0.087) (0.081) (0.088)
Education (Upper Secondary) 0.023 0.004 -0.018 -0.031
(0.072) (0.083) (0.066) (0.073)
Lower Tertiary 0.006 -0.012 -0.008 -0.013
(0.165) (0.180) (0.123) (0.152)
Higher Tertiary 0.116 0.094 0.038 0.012
(0.100) (0.109) (0.101) (0.096)
Unemployment -0.037 -0.046 -0.026 -0.027
(0.112) (0.084) (0.107) (0.101)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 32 32 32 32
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34
Obs. 14545 14545 14545 14545
R-sq. 0.169 0.192 0.152 0.139
Summary: This table reports the beta coe¢ cient in order to compare
how strong is the Great Expectations e¤ect compared to others.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values
from 0-6 with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust in
Parliament", "Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust in the
Political Parties" take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10
denoting "complete trust"; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the
dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
54
Table B.9: Robustness: The Policy Implications of the Great Expectations E¤ect-
Controlling for the Rate of Assimilation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strong Follow Displayed Signed Interested
Government Rules Campaign Badge Petition in Politics
Corruption (Origin) -0.102 -0.139 0.005 0.028 -0.017
(0.012) (0.013) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 132 132 132 132 132
No. of Host Countries 34 34 34 34 34
Obs. 14173 14173 14173 14173 14173
R-sq. 0.080 0.081 0.057 0.114 0.127
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the policy implications of
the Great Expectations e¤ect while controlling for a number of assimilation
controls such as citizenship, voting, discriminated groups and duration of stay.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values from 0-6
with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) Strong Government indicates to what extend
individuals agree with the statement "government is strong and ensures safety". The variable
takes values from 1 to 6 with 1 denoting Very much like meand 6 denoting Not like me at all;
(iii) Follow Rulesindicates to what extend individuals agree with the statement " Important to
do what is told and follow rules". The variable takes values from 1 to 6 with 1 denoting Very
much like meand 6 denoting Not like me at all; (iv) "Displayed Campaign Badge" corresponds
to the question Worn or displayed campaign badge/stick in the last 12 months . The variable
is binary with 1 denoting Yes and 2 denoting No; (v) Signed Petition corresponds to the
question During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Firstly...Signed a
petition. The variable is binary with 1 denoting Yes and 2 denoting No; (vi) Interested
in Politics corresponds to the question How interested would you say you are in politicswith
1 denoting Very Interested and 4 denoting Hardly Interested; (vii) Robust standard error
estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (viii)
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table B.10: Origin Institutions and Native Trust: A Negative Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Native Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Native) 1.084 1.276 0.866 0.868
(0.041) (0.044) (0.032) (0.033)
No of Countries 25 25 25 25
R-sq. 0.952 0.959 0.968 0.965
Summary: This table shows that corruption at the origin country is
negatively correlated with native trust thereby suggesting that the Great
Expectations e¤ects holds only for institutions at the host country.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the ICRG Index. The index takes values
from 0-6 with 6 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) The variables "Trust
in Parliament", "Trust in the Legal System", "Trust in Politicians" and "Trust
in the Political Parties" take values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust; (iii) All the trust measures are aggregated at
the country level after excluding the sample of migrants. The measures are the
average of the years 2000-2012; (iv) Robust standard error estimates, clustered
at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (v) ***
denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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C Summary Statistics
This section summarizes the inows and outows of migrants for the full sample. Tables C.1-
C.5 show the migration ows categorized by birth coutnry, whereas Table C.6 summarizes the
migration ows by destination country.
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Table C.1: Countries of Origin of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Generation Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Albania 14 271 Greece 239
Algeria 15 363 Russian Federation 21
Angola 9 126 Portugal 104
Argentina 14 125 Israel 53
Armenia 15 67 Switzerland 106
Australia 13 44 United Kingdom 21
Austria 23 290 Russian Federation 25
Azerbaijan 9 75 United Kingdom 27
Bahrain 1 1 Luxembourg 49
Bangladesh 6 35 France 4
Belarus 13 353 Israel 47
Belgium 19 179 United Kingdom 1
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 6 44 United Kingdom 2
Brazil 18 212 Spain 34
Brunei Darussalam 2 3 Portugal 123
Bulgaria 25 207 Estonia 143
Burkina Faso 2 5 United Kingdom 20
C?te dIvoire 4 19 Belgium 28
Cameroon 10 20 Belgium 21
Canada 15 62 France 13
Chile 14 69 Sweden 28
China 18 84 France 7
Colombia 12 74 Netherlands 11
Congo 9 60 Spain 48
Congo, the Democratic Republic .. 8 46 Israel 1
Costa Rica 1 1 Spain 19
Croatia 14 323 Greece 19
Cuba 10 33 Slovakia 151
Cyprus 6 41 Switzerland 358
Czech Republic 23 363 Sweden 64
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Table C.2: Countries of Origin of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Generation Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Denmark 13 154 Spain 10
Dominican Republic 7 21 France 270
Ecuador 7 86 Spain 73
Egypt 16 126 Finland 27
El Salvador 3 5 Israel 75
Estonia 7 62 France 113
Ethiopia 11 95 Israel 75
Finland 13 339 Sweden 274
France 24 637 Belgium 194
Gabon 2 2 Belgium 1
Gambia 4 8 Ireland 387
Germany 30 1219 United Kingdom 16
Ghana 10 37 Spain 3
Greece 22 246 Portugal 15
Guatemala 4 6 Cyprus 62
Guinea 8 23 Switzerland 3
Guinea-Bissau 1 9 Portugal 9
Guyana 3 5 United Kingdom 2
Haiti 3 10 United Kingdom 10
Honduras 2 3 Switzerland 2
Hong Kong 4 17 Slovenia 201
Hungary 22 326 France 8
Iceland 6 25 Slovakia 79
India 15 297 Netherlands 154
Indonesia 9 171 United Kingdom 196
Iran, Islamic Republic of 14 269 Norway 3
Iraq 15 428 United Kingdom 151
Ireland 13 224 Israel 294
Israel 9 15 Israel 145
Italy 23 1093 Denmark 12
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Table C.3: Immigration Flows by Birth Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Jamaica 4 82 Switzerland 351
Japan 10 20 United Kingdom 78
Jordan 9 14 Denmark 3
Kazakhstan 12 221 Switzerland 4
Kenya 7 36 United Kingdom 28
Korea, Democratic Peoples Repu.. 4 4 Netherlands 1
Korea, Republic of 8 13 Denmark 3
Kuwait 3 4 Sweden 2
Latvia 16 97 Germany 85
Lebanon 11 75 Sweden 23
Liberia 2 3 Switzerland 23
Libya 9 94 United Kingdom 2
Lithuania 14 105 Ireland 25
Luxembourg 5 11 Belgium 6
Madagascar 3 15 Estonia 42
Malaysia 7 19 Israel 80
Mali 3 9 Israel 557
Malta 3 11 Ukraine 26
Mexico 9 21 France 13
Moldova, Republic of 15 90 France 7
Mongolia 3 3 United Kingdom 3
Morocco 16 1076 Germany 1
Mozambique 5 40 United Kingdom 9
Myanmar 2 4 Switzerland 6
Namibia 1 1 United Kingdom 7
Netherlands 21 283 Portugal 36
New Zealand 6 11 United Kingdom 1
Nicaragua 1 3 Netherlands 1
Niger 2 2 Ireland 38
Nigeria 12 93 Spain 3
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Table C.4: Immigration Flows by Birth Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Norway 12 103 Belgium 134
Pakistan 16 191 Sweden 67
Panama 3 3 United Kingdom 5
Papua New Guinea 1 1 Spain 1
Paraguay 4 11 Spain 35
Peru 14 63 Netherlands 1
Philippines 17 86 Ireland 19
Poland 28 1100 United Kingdom 108
Portugal 14 428 Israel 280
Romania 27 782 Luxembourg 134
Russian Federation 28 3211 Spain 8
Saudi Arabia 3 4 Israel 274
Senegal 7 38 Switzerland 40
Serbia 17 144 Estonia 1551
Sierra Leone 1 3 United Kingdom 2
Singapore 4 9 Ireland 5
Slovakia 16 332 Norway 79
Slovenia 10 48 United Kingdom 6
Somalia 9 43 Croatia 13
South Africa 13 83 Czech Republic 246
Spain 20 319 United Kingdom 3
Sri Lanka 11 79 France 17
Sudan 7 16 United Kingdom 10
Suriname 1 109 Netherlands 109
Swaziland 1 2 Spain 2
Sweden 14 151 Israel 80
Syrian Arab Republic 15 134 Israel 2
Taiwan, Province of China 2 2 Germany 3
Tanzania, United Republic of 3 8 Norway 9
Thailand 12 37 Israel 136
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Table C.5: Immigration Flows by Birth Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Togo 5 10 Greece 241
Trinidad and Tobago 3 5 United Kingdom 3
Tunisia 13 257 Switzerland 1
Turkey 18 949 United Kingdom 5
Uganda 5 17 Estonia 238
Ukraine 27 825 United Kingdom 9
United Kingdom 22 666 Israel 76
United States 26 330 Israel 12
Uruguay 7 27 Spain 11
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 10 25 France 11
Viet Nam 12 71 Israel 233
Yemen 4 236 United Kingdom 29
Zambia 2 6 United Kingdom 5
Zimbabwe 5 20 United Kingdom 13
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Table C.6: Migration Flows by Country of Destination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number
Birth Immigrants Prevalent Immigrants
Countries in Destin. Birth from most
Country Country Prevalent Country
Albania 3 21 Greece 19
Austria 38 366 Germany 83
Belgium 80 1231 Italy 204
Bulgaria 14 134 Romania 52
Croatia 8 56 Germany 358
Cyprus 35 167 Greece 62
Czech Republic 20 411 Slovakia 246
Denmark 66 459 Poland 275
Estonia 22 2095 Germany 103
Finland 44 213 Russian Federation 1551
France 73 1349 Morocco 92
Germany 82 1482 Russian Federation 60
Greece 35 729 Algeria 270
Hungary 23 207 Ireland 196
Iceland 15 34 Turkey 241
Ireland 72 901 Serbia 25
Israel 70 3711 Romania 110
Italy 33 70 United Kingdom 387
Lithuania 10 112 Morocco 557
Luxembourg 34 430 Denmark 7
Netherlands 79 850 Romania 8
Norway 60 561 Russian Federation 60
Poland 21 171 Portugal 134
Portugal 31 379 Indonesia 154
Russian Federation 21 411 Sweden 79
Slovakia 14 293 Germany 69
Slovenia 19 326 Brazil 123
Spain 62 746 Ukraine 198
Sweden 86 1057 Finland 274
Switzerland 84 1730 Croatia 201
Turkey 10 66 Czech Republic 151
Ukraine 22 1016 Bulgaria 36
United Kingdom 91 1206 Russian Federation 796
Albania 5
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